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Paradoxically, the political success of human rights is often taken to be its philosophical 
failing. From US interventions to International NGOs to indigenous movements, human 
rights have found a place in diverse political spaces, while being applied to disparate goals 
and expressed in a range of practices. This heteronomy is vital to the global appeal of 
human rights, but for traditional moral and political philosophy it is something of a scandal. 
This paper is an initial attempt to understand and theorize human rights on the terrain of the 
social actors who put them to use, particularly radical activists that have a more critical 
relationship to human rights. 
 
Attempting to avoid the philosophical pathology of demanding that the world reflect our 
conception of it, we base our reflection on the ambiguous, and potentially un-patterned, 
texture of human rights practice – taking seriously the idea that human rights express a 
relationship of power, importantly concerned with its legitimate arrangement and 
limitation. In both the philosophical literature and human rights activism there seems to be 
a consensus on basic rights as undeniable moral principles of political legitimacy. This use 
of human rights is contrasted with radical social movements that reject this conception of 
rights as ideological and illegitimate, making specific reference to the Zapatista movement 
(Chiapas, Mexico) and the Landless Peasant Movement of Brazil (MST, from the 
Portuguese Movimento dos trabalhadores rurais Sem Terra), which are critical of the 
human rights discourse, but also make strategic use of the idea and offer alternative 
articulations of political legitimacy. 
 
Keywords: Human Rights, Agonism, Discourse, Activism, EZLN, MST. 
 
“Not to assert one’s right. –To exercise power costs effort and demands 
courage. That is why so many fail to assert rights to which they are 
perfectly entitled –because a right is a kind of power but they are too lazy 
or too cowardly to exercise it. The virtues which cloak these faults are 
called patience and forbearance.”  
– Friedrich Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human 
1. Introduction 
 
Over a few weeks at the end of 2009, we witnessed the invocation of human 
rights in the prosecution of Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chu, in the 
unabashedly militaristic Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech of US President Barack 
Obama, and, surreally, in a deodorant ad, which declared the fundamental rights 
belonging to our underarm skin.1 These invocations, ranging from encouraging to 
                                                
1 In the same month that the International Criminal Court began its second prosecution, against 
Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chu for human rights abuses committed in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo (24 November 2009), British television viewers were informed that their underarm 
skin had three fundamental rights. The commercial in question was for Sanex deodorant, available 
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disappointing, and to ridiculous, not only reveal the ubiquitous use of rights-talk, but 
also a troubling question about the practical politics that follows from the 
international normative architecture that human rights support. Is the spread of human 
rights a story of the progressive legalization of international politics, powerfully 
demonstrated by the success of institutions like the International Criminal Court, as 
Seyla Benhabib hopes (2006)? Is it a tale of liberal decline, in which human rights 
provide the ideological bulwark for a liberal international order under threat and in 
need of support? (Charvet & Kaczynska-Nay 2008) Or, perhaps, human rights are 
simply a fiction (MacIntyre 2007, 63), meaningless at best and pernicious at worst – 
providing moral pretense to a coercive international politics, illustrated through the 
invasion of Iraq (justified at least in part as a defence of human rights), the attempted 
legitimization of torture by the Bush administration, and ongoing debate about the 
legitimacy of various forms of humanitarian intervention (Douzinas, 2006).  
 
The international human rights regime permeates world politics. Human rights 
remain an essential foreign policy tool, as Richard Falk (2000, Chapter 3) has noted, 
while they also support a growing international legal regime that challenges the 
primacy of the Westphalian state (Falk, 2007). Further, human rights have both 
justified oppressive international practices and provided inspiration for various 
resistance movements (Bhambra & Shilliam 2009, 4-7). Given this ambiguity, one 
could be forgiven for thinking that something has gone badly wrong with the idea of 
human rights, either in its formulation or the translation of theory into action.  
 
It is in terms of the relationship between theory and practical action, or 
between morality and politics, that we want to analyze the dominant account of 
human rights. This account, we contend, is premised upon an unsustainable division 
between moral philosophy and political action, a division that we argue has negative 
consequences for how human rights are used in international politics. In both the 
philosophical literature and much transnational human rights activism there is a 
consensus on human rights as undeniable moral principles that support a liberal 
account of political legitimacy. We argue that human rights are inherently political 
and contested, undermining the role that universal principles play in legitimating the 
contemporary international order. Our alternative starts from an acknowledgement of 
the politics of human rights, recognizing that political legitimacy and power are 
contested when fundamental rights are claimed. This requires that we see morality 
and politics as inseparable. Rights are reconstructed as a moralized politics (or 
perhaps politicized morality) in which the meaning of political legitimacy and human 
dignity are continuously renegotiated, rather than final expressions of the moral law 
or the progressive unfolding of universal standards of legitimacy. This account of 
human rights is supported and developed through an examination of radical social 
movements that reject the dominant international human rights regime as ideological 
and illegitimate, while making use of the language of human rights and articulating 
alternative accounts of political legitimacy – we look specifically at the Zapatista 
                                                                                                                                       
here: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gWw7VCXWHhE&feature=player_embedded. Also, in his 
Noble Peace Prize acceptance speech President Obama restated the centrality of human rights in US 
foreign policy, stating ‘Agreements among nations.  Strong institutions.  Support for human rights.  
Investments in development.  All these are vital ingredients in bringing about the evolution that 
President Kennedy spoke about.’ Accessed on 24 January 2010 at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-acceptance-nobel-peace-prize.  
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movement (Chiapas, Mexico) and the Landless Peasant Movement of Brazil (MST, 
from the Portuguese Movimento dos trabalhadores rurais Sem Terra). 
 
2. Human Rights: a story of many scandals 
The success of the international human rights regime reveals a paradox: 
human rights bolster both the political ends of hegemonic global powers and radical 
social movements. And, it seems that global diversity undermines the moral 
consensus necessary to legitimate strong action to protect human rights even while 
human rights seem ever more pervasive. Further, we have ‘all these human rights 
standards but the bodies keep piling up’ (Dunne & Wheeler 1999, 2), raising the 
question of why better human rights protection has not been achieved. All of these 
tensions point to vigorous debates in the human rights literature, which we label 
“scandals”, in order to highlight a fundamental problem with how dominant 
understandings of human rights are understood. Defenders of human rights, generally, 
respond to these ambiguities as if they were “scandals” calling for more certain 
responses – certainty of the legitimacy of the liberal international order, certainty of 
the benefit of a more cosmopolitan legal order, and certainty of the power of universal 
moral principles to improve world politics. The call for greater certainty in the face of 
the ambiguity of human rights presumes a particular relationship between morality 
and politics, one that we analyze and reject in what follows. We then attempt to think 
about human rights without denying their ambiguity, drawing on both critical 
philosophers and radical social movements.  
 
In the next section we analyze the dominant response to the scandals that beset 
human rights with reference to “philosophers” and “activists” – these terms are used 
both as simplifying generalizations and rhetorical devices intended to provoke critical 
reflection.2 We argue that the “philosopher” and the “activist” respond to these 
scandals in distinct but related ways that reveal the limitations of the relationship 
between morality and politics that informs dominant accounts of human rights. 
Further, we argue that this understanding of human rights limits our analysis and 
critique of world politics by privileging a liberal state-based international order. 
 
Conor Gearty (2006) asks, can human rights survive? Central to his concern 
for the future of human rights is a worry about their legitimacy, given the spread of 
human rights through ‘international, regional and legal instruments that embed the 
term in various codes of law’ and which makes their misappropriation a very real 
danger (Gearty 2006, 11-13). Gearty highlights the “philosophical scandal” of human 
rights: their spread coincides with the failure to establish a rational consensus on their 
meaning and justification. While Tony Evans (2005) suggests that the political 
dominance of human rights discourse no longer needs rational foundations and that 
the philosophy of human rights is now a desiccated simulacrum, looking at current 
philosophical work on human rights reveals a state of very active distress. Many 
contemporary philosophers are clearly concerned to ‘articulate standards by which the 
                                                
2 We knowingly use these classifications as provocations and anticipate that many who self-identify as 
philosophers or activists would reject the account of human rights assigned to them. The intention is to 
spur critique of a dominant account of human rights that, we contend, continues to employ this divide 
between theory and action, though often in mediated form. We appreciate that other critical 
perspectives, particularly those inspired by feminist and Marxist thought, may take this as a starting 
point, but assume that this sharp rhetorical distinction may still prompt important reflection, as it has 
done for us. 
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practice of human rights can be judged, standards which will indicate what human 
rights we have’ (Raz 2007, 2), a vital task entailed by a particular understanding of 
the relationship between morality and politics.  
 
Gearty (2005) summarizes the “philosopher’s” need for justification:  
This is not ordinary politics, we say, this is morality, this is about right and 
wrong – and we know, even if you mere mortals don’t, which is right and 
which is wrong, not as a matter of policy but as statement of truth. This is 
not how most of politics works. 
 
With characteristic good humour, Gearty gets at the dominant understanding of rights 
and the ends they are intended to serve: human rights are moral principles that should 
direct the flow of politics, they are points of certainty that allow “us” to make out the 
shape of legitimate authority and moral right at a universal level.3 This points to the 
divide between “philosopher” and “activist”. This is not the result of philosophical 
arrogance or the inability of activism to be reflective; rather it is a consequence of the 
logic of a particular way of understanding human rights. When James Griffin (2008, 
4) says, ‘remedying the indeterminateness of sense, in the logic of human rights, 
determining the content of human rights, especially in seeing how to resolve conflict 
between them, the bottom-up approach will have to rise considerably in theoretical 
abstraction’, he is giving voice to a conception of morality as above politics and 
imbued with a vital measure of certainty. This understanding of human rights reflects 
a well-established subordination of the political to the moral in contemporary political 
theory, which is increasingly contested in both domestic and international political 
theory (Williams 2005; Connolly 1991, 2005; Honig 1993, 2008; Hutchings 1999).  
Another philosophical understanding of human rights is possible, which questions the 
separation of politics and morality, and places contestation and ambiguity at the 
center of human rights; we explore this approach in section 4.  
 
In contrast, the “activist” is impatient with questions of how human rights 
campaigning must take account of controversies over the moral ideal of human rights. 
From this perspective, the “scandal” of human rights is that we know what is right but 
fail to act effectively, or to act at all. The central concern is how to translate the moral 
truth of human rights into effective action, asking:  
 
Would it not be better to question less and act more, to avoid reflection on 
abstract ideas like philosophical foundations and the like but to continue to 
use the term ‘human rights’ to do good things in a world in which goodness 
is in short supply – and where it is a waste of time and effort to spend time 
trying to explain what goodness actually means? (Gearty 2006, 20) 
 
Much transnational human rights activism does not oppose this understanding of 
rights: human rights are powerful forces for political change precisely because of their 
                                                
3 A recent trend towards ‘political’ conceptions of right proves rather than refutes Gearty’s point. 
Drawing inspiration from Rawls’ turn to a political rather than metaphysical defense of liberalism, a 
number of recent thinkers have defended human rights terms of second-order consensus on the 
principles that make politics possible. While this changes the form of the argument it does little to alter 
the purpose of human rights as moral principles defining and confining the limits of legitimate political 
authority. See for example, Joshua Cohen (2004); Kenneth Baynes (2009); and John Rawls (2001). 
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distance from the contingent world of politics, in which compromise, self-interest and 
coercion are everyday threats to effective moral action (Hopgood 2006, 105-107, 
2009; Kohen 2006). Both the “philosopher” and the “activist” guard their distance 
from politics, as it is central to their identities and their often-unacknowledged moral 
authority, which is preserved in the idea that theories of human rights are removed 
from the conduct of politics as struggle, contest and power, and that human rights 
activism is a moral practice, not mere political action. The implication of these 
simplified identities is that “philosophers” and “activists” have little to say to each 
other, and that for the “activist” the cause of human rights is best served by working 
to ensure that rights are respected, without reflecting too much on abstract problems 
that might impair one’s ability to act.  
 
But this is, of course, a limited account of activism. In what follows we play 
on contrasting meanings of activism, juxtaposing the activism of transnational human 
rights NGOs (specifically Amnesty International and Oxfam) and the radical activism 
of the Zapatista Liberation Army (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional - EZLN) 
and the MST.4 The professionalized activism characteristic of transnational human 
rights NGOs is dependent upon the assumed authority of human rights, and critical 
reflection is often limited to determining what is possible given the current framework 
of power relations, rather than the ways in which international human rights might be 
part of the problem. For more radical forms of activism human rights may set certain 
limits to which campaigners have to mould their banner logos, but they do set the 
limits of their political imagination. When the activist in the deep jungles of the 
Lacandona Forest reflects on the meaning of human rights, she is challenging the 
power relations that has made her life one of poverty and subordination, and for 
which it might be necessary to give rights new meanings or names. Another 
“scandal”, then, is how the discourse of human rights may provide articulation for 
certain struggles and demands, while at the same time, limiting the range of demands 
that groups and individuals are entitled to make.  
 
While drawing on critics of the human rights regime to make our argument, 
we also want to point to the way in which marginalized groups use human rights, 
highlighting the danger that rights talk can become a weapon of the weak that limits 
subjects of power to a particular moralized conception of the state and the 
international order, but also finding more radical potential in the idea of human rights. 
The final figure in this story, then, is the “radical”, referring to individuals and groups 
that reconstruct both the practice and idea of human rights in light of their own 
experience and pursue a surprising variety of ends. This understanding of human 
rights emerges by connecting critiques of human rights with an emerging literature on 
the practices of human rights, which documents the way rights are translated, 
reinterpreted and claimed by persons all too often seen as the passive recipients of 
human rights protection or the threatened victims of abuse. Paying closer attention to 
the way human rights are used reconnects the idea of human rights to actual political 
struggles and social movements in which rights are established, defined and 
contested, making it difficult to narrate the story of human rights as one of the 
progressive unfolding of universal rights and to frame the human rights practice as 
                                                
4 The main rationale for focusing on these two groups, rather than other similarly radical groups, is the 
authors’ own experience of being involved in campaigns in support of both the Zapatistas and the MST 
in Spain, Australia and Brazil. 
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non-political (Honig 2008). In the end, our goal is not to dictate reforms that 
“philosophers” and “activists” must make. Instead, we seek to expose the problematic 
consequences that this way of thinking and acting on human rights generate.  In light 
of this we suggest another way of thinking about human rights that, on one hand, 
takes contestation, contingency and change more seriously when theorizing, and that 
looks at social movements, political struggles and the systemic exclusions generated 
by the political reality of human rights practices.  
 
3. “Philosophers” and “Activists”  
 
The philosophical understanding of human rights that we argue is both 
currently dominant and conceptually problematic is concerned with establishing 
universal moral standards that determine legitimate political authority. Moral certainty 
is the end in view, establishing sufficient certainty to provide for a just political order. 
The challenges to achieving this end is disagreement, conflict and diversity in moral 
beliefs and political orders, and while few supporters of human rights speak in terms 
of the exercise of power or enforcing discipline, the effect of a successful human 
rights ideal is a limitation of moral and political life. For this reason, defenders of this 
view of human rights attempt to establish and preserve the moral authority of rights, 
as well as the moral authority of the guarantors of human rights, whether agents of the 
state or the international community.  
 
Tony Evans argues (2005, 1053) that the conventional status of human rights 
leads to a legalized discourse that marginalizes philosophical and political questions. 
If the primary problem of human rights is one of ‘refining, polishing, and elaborating 
accepted norms and standards, in attempt to make the regime more elegant, 
sophisticated, imposing, and magisterial’, there is little place, or need, for sustained 
philosophical inquiry (Evans 2005, 1048). Yet, such inquiry continues apace. Evans is 
right to point out that much philosophical work on human rights is not concerned with 
radical critique, but the point we want to draw out is that this is as much a result of 
how human rights are understood as it is about their privileged status in world 
politics. Philosophers still struggle to legitimate human rights because the truth of 
rights remains uncertain, and to challenge the truth of universal rights claims puts the 
political order it sustains into question.  
 
Moral rights are linked to certainty and legislation – these principles provide 
the foundation for law, which in turn justly limits politics (Williams 2005, 12-17). If 
political activity feeds into philosophical reflection on rights at all, it is largely 
negative, raising questions of how to limit illegitimate rights proliferation (see Griffin, 
2008, Chapter 11), or how to convince the skeptic that they must acknowledge that 
universal rights are rationally justified (Raz, 2007, 18-19). In both cases the failure of 
moral principle to constrain political life becomes a problem to be solved by offering 
truer accounts of rights.  
 
Framing the question of universal human rights in this way leads to a 
seemingly irresolvable argument about the truth of rights, leading philosophers to 
seek different ways of proving or justifying rights as a proposition – as a truth claim. 
Modeling moral principles upon propositional statements that must be either true or 
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false tends to lead to either un-provable appeals to universal human nature or 
apodictic assertions of right or duty.5 What is lost is the contests and exercise of 
power that led to the emergence of human rights, an emergence that was not 
necessary and does not express a coherent progressive practice (Honig, 2008, 95).  
The philosophical understanding of human rights, as moral rights, draws on static 
principles separated from political activity. Obscuring the reality that human rights are 
the result of social struggles that challenge the structures of political power, and 
conventional morality. The moral standards presented by the “philosopher” are part of 
historical transformations in which social movements played a central role (Hunt 
2007, 22-34; Bhambra & Shilliam 2009, 6-7).6 Human rights cannot be seen only 
through the prism of moral authority, but must also be seen as challenges to that 
authority. This dynamic process is captured in the declarations and covenants of the 
human rights movement, documents that reveal a history of social contestation that 
the legislative model of human rights obscures.7  
 
We will illustrate these points by looking at two contemporary accounts of 
human rights, those of James Griffin and Seyla Benhabib, which, for all their 
sophistication and rigor, preserve the legislative relationship between morality and 
politics. This relationship not only obscures the disciplinary and coercive aspects of 
human rights as a form of moral authority, but also limits the possibility of 
reconstructing (rather than merely reforming) human rights.  
 
In his recent book on human rights James Griffin (2008) attempts to provide a 
rationalist justification of rights based on a universal interest in rational agency, and 
while his work has many virtues, we will use it here as an illustration of the limits of 
the “philosopher’s” traditional approach to human rights (Raz, 2007, 4-5). At the 
center of Griffin’s inquiry is the need to resolve disagreement about human rights and 
to provide a justification for them as vital protections of what is morally significant 
about our shared human status (2008, 32-33). Griffin argues that what is of primary 
importance is our agency, which he analyzes in terms of individual autonomy and 
liberty, and that human rights should be limited to those rights necessary to protect 
human agency (2008, 33-37). While granting the importance of particular 
circumstances in determining the exact form of human rights, he defends the central 
importance of agency in both justifying and defining human rights. He suggests that 
17th and 18th century accounts of rights remain for us the last major development of 
the idea itself (Griffin, 13) – while it might be plausible that a particular tradition of 
philosophical reflection has not advanced much in that time, it is an unconvincing 
claim regarding the theoretical and political evolution of human rights.8 
                                                
5 This mirrors the debate between interest and will theories of rights. See, Vittorio Bufacchi (2008). 
6 Lynn Hunt (2007) documents the political and social changes that gave specificity and meaning to the 
idea of self-evident rights in both the American Declaration of Independence and the French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. 
7 Paul Gilroy (1993) has argued that the concept of ‘human rights’ was first used as part of slaves’ 
struggles in North America advocating for the abolition of slavery. Further, Magubane (2005, 101) has 
shown that the Haitian revolution helped foster the French Revolution, in which the ‘Rights of Men’ so 
ingrained became in the history of rights.  
8 Recent historical work on human rights illustrates this ongoing evolution: Ishay (2004) and Lauren 
(2003) both provide broad accounts, but even work with a more skeptical historiography illustrates the 
continued development of human rights, for an excellent and thorough account see Afshari (2007).  
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Griffin (2008, 191-209) criticizes the international human rights regime, 
particularly the breadth of rights listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
and seeks to limit rights proliferation in order to maintain the importance of ‘true’ 
human rights. In reducing human rights to the protection of agency Griffin seems to 
miss what is important about many well-established rights and to occlude many other 
important values that could be seen to justify human rights (Tasioulas, 2002; Raz, 
2007, 4-8). This critique of Griffin is limited as it only points to his reductionism – 
making autonomy and liberty the central values that protect an essentially 
Enlightenment-inspired account of human rights – rather than to his appeal to a 
universal essence that defines our human status. While such essentialist appeals can 
be objected to on purely practical ground, as finding agreement on such universals is 
exceedingly difficult, a more principled criticism is that appeals to an essential human 
nature cannot take account of the social construction, and ongoing contestation, of 
human nature and ethical values. Griffin’s essentialism is paradigmatic of the 
traditional understanding of human rights, which prioritizes some value or feature of 
human individuality as having moral priority, missing the political function of human 
rights as a distinctive form of moral right (Raz, 2007, 7-9).  
 
It is, therefore, not surprising that Griffin makes no connection between the 
spread of market economies or powerful bureaucratic states and the construction of a 
supposedly universal form of rational agency (Robinson 1998), as exposing the 
contingent and political nature of the values of autonomy and liberty would 
undermine the moral authority of human rights. Further, his efforts to establish rights 
as protections for an essential moral agency are defined by the desire to make political 
structures conform to moral principle, which obscures not only the contingency of 
human rights values but also denies the persistence of moral contestation and that ‘the 
application of any such set of historical constructions also does violence to those to 
whom it is applied’ (Connolly 1991, 12) We do not want to suggest that Griffin is 
merely defending an ideological form of liberal agency, the values he points to are 
real enough – being able to envision a life for oneself and having the freedom to 
pursue that vision are real goods – but in pursuing a legislative form of political 
moralism his account is not only reductive but fundamentally disconnected from 
social and political practice.9  
 
Griffin’s defense of human rights hardly exhausts the potential of this 
legislative way of thinking about the relationship of morality and politics. Raz 
contrasts Griffin’s traditional approach with what he terms the political approach, 
which he himself defends (2007, 8-9). Kenneth Baynes reviews this emerging defense 
of rights, which justifies human rights as special rights held based on particular forms 
of association (2009, 374).  A political justification can be more or less substantive. 
Some have argued for a minimal set of human rights as protections necessary for any 
political society (Ignatieff 2003; Rawls 2001, 78-81). While other argue that human 
rights are not just the minimal requirements for legitimate political authority, but 
provide a more substantive account of the good of membership in political society, 
which may not reflect an achieved consensus but gives reasonable grounds for further 
debate and eventual convergence (Cohen 2008, Beitz 2003). This move avoids the 
essentialism that undermines Griffin’s argument and rightly places human rights in a 
                                                
9 We take the phrase ‘political moralism’ from Williams (2005, 1-17), who uses it to identify views that 
make the moral prior to the political.  
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distinctly international context by conceiving of human rights as limitations on state 
sovereignty. Yet, it still conceives of the function of rights in a distinctly apolitical 
way: either suggesting that except for the commission of certain grievous wrongs, the 
actions of the nation-state, and the state-system, should be accepted as legitimate, in 
the case of minimal accounts; or that a distinctly liberal (whether nationalist or 
cosmopolitan) order provides the moral standard for state legitimacy, in the more 
substantive accounts. Or as Benhabib asks, ‘Are we caught between the Scylla of 
moral imperialism and the Charybdis of moral indifference?’ (2008, 98) This political 
account reveals the tension between tolerating political diversity and the justification 
of universal norms, a tension that these accounts attempt to mediate with appeals to 
“public reason”, arguing that certain norms rationally follow from the shared nature of 
political morality. Before articulating our alternative understanding of rights we do 
want to consider Benhabib’s defense of human rights, as it both takes political 
critiques of human rights more seriously and is more self-conscious of the danger that 
deploying rational moral principles may limit diversity in unacceptable ways.10  
 
 Benhabib’s defense of human rights is based upon the relationship between 
universal rights and democratic sovereignty, a relationship that may seem 
antagonistic, but which she suggests is complementary.  Following Jürgen Habermas, 
she defends human rights as universal moral norms that express the necessary 
conditions of seeking moral consensus (Habermas, 1992, 1998; Benhabib, 2008, 102). 
The legal expression of these norms is found in the defining traditions of liberalism 
and republicanism, such that rights both protect individuals and empower them as 
members of a political society – ensuring both individual liberty and collective self-
determination – as matters of moral principle (Habermas, 1994, 1998). The apparent 
contradiction, then, is that the universal political norms expressed through human 
rights actually undermine democratic sovereignty. 
 
 For both thinkers the spread of human rights norms requires the expansion of 
democracy beyond the nation-state. Benhabib does this by looking to the way in 
which international human rights norms are actually worked out through democratic 
iterations in which human rights are made ‘elements in the public culture of 
democratic peoples through their own process of interpretation articulation, and 
iteration.’ (2009, 696) This implies that human rights, as universal moral principles, 
entail general protections for individuals and rights to democratic participation, but 
that the exact form that these principles will take depends upon the particular situation 
in which they are worked out. This has drastic implications for international order, 
such that a cosmopolitan one should replace the state-centric order, as it is not enough 
to protect the individual liberties of all individuals, which could possibly be done in a 
such a system, because individual also have a right to self-determination that requires 
the expansion of democratic participation.  
 
 Her account highlights the necessity of democratic sovereignty beyond the 
nation-state in calls for a global constitutionalism, insists upon the protection of social 
and economic rights that counter the power of global capitalism and cautions against 
the idea of a right to intervention (2009, 692-695). Although this allows for some 
                                                
10 Benhabib’s appeal to communicative reason is distinct from, and we think more challenging than, the 
Rawlsian inspired account of public reason, for this reason we forgo a direct engagement with the 
Rawlsian approach here. 
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contestation, the degree of contestation and difference is constrained, as it is only 
when moral principles are upheld can it be said that there ‘is legitimate “unity and 
diversity” in human rights among well-ordered polities.’ (Benhabib, 2008, 100) So, 
even as democratic iterations lead to diversity, they also lead to convergence, because 
the moral principles that provide the foundation of rights cannot be contradictory or 
ambiguous. As Honig suggests, the ‘assumption in Habermas and Benhabib of linear 
time secures what I call a chrono-logic in relation to which they assess new rights: 
new rights-claims are judged in terms of the rights’ amenability to being subsumed 
under existing constitutional or universal categories (2008, 90). Despite the attempt to 
mediate the legislative relationship between morality and politics, Benhabib’s defense 
of human rights cannot ‘see how new rights-claims do not necessarily demand mere 
inclusion in a previously stabilized order. They may. But they may also demand a new 
world. They may unsettle previously existing categories of right.’ (Honig, 2008, 90) 
This is a result of the role that moral principles, derived from Habermas’ account of 
communicative reason, play in limiting contestation and imposing order upon ethical 
and political life. Kimberly Hutchings clearly articulates the limitations of this 
approach: if ‘one accepts this, then clearly one has again returned to a version of 
liberal universalism which always already knows its moral superiority’ (Hutchings, 
2005, 162). 
 
 Acknowledging the politics of human rights as moral principles, however, is 
paradoxical – once we deny privilege to any moral perspective, insisting that 
contestation, exclusion and power be exposed, the logic of the legislative account of 
rights becomes untenable. While we defend an alternative understanding of human 
rights below – one defined by an affirmation of ‘the reality of perpetual contest, even 
within an ordered setting, and [a commitment] to identify the dimensions of 
contestation’ (Honig 1993, 15) – for the moment we turn to the figure of the “activist” 
and the way in which practices of transnational human rights activists depend upon 
the separation of moral principle and political action. 
 
The second figure that plays an opposing though related role in the conception 
of human rights we have been criticizing is the “activist” – in particular the 
transnational human rights activist. Our focus will not be the function of NGOs in the 
human rights regime, but instead the way that NGOs “activists” conceptualize human 
rights. In looking at the figures of the “philosopher” and the “activist” we are ignoring 
international lawyers and human rights workers within national governments and 
international organizations, this is done not because these figures are unimportant. In 
focusing on transnational activists and NGOs we are looking to those engaged in the 
politics of human rights while deploying the moral authority of human rights. The 
lawyer and bureaucrat are less dependent upon this moral authority. 
 
Stephen Hopgood’s (2009, 231-233) work is among the first to examine the 
way that human rights NGOs use and understand the moral principles that are central 
to their work. What is most surprising is the quasi-religious role that human rights 
play, both in terms of individual commitment and in sociological terms.11 Hopgood 
suggests that human rights – his research specifically looks at Amnesty International 
(AI) – act as a transcendent form of moral authority that is otherwise impossible in a 
contemporary international context in which religious belief is marginalized. For all 
                                                
11 This point is well made by Jenna Reinbold (2011) in this special issue. 
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the power of constructivist work on human rights NGOs and transnational advocacy 
networks, what is not examined is how activists understand human rights or how ideas 
about those rights evolve through practical political activity. Thomas Risse and 
Stephen Ropp (1999, 234-235) suggest that ‘it is one thing to argue that there is a 
global human rights polity composed of international regimes, organizations, and 
supportive advocacy coalitions. It is quite another to claim that these global norms 
made a real difference in the daily practices of national governments toward their 
citizens [emphasis added].’ Yet the goal of determining the effectiveness of human 
rights norms begs the question of what these global norms actually are. As Hopgood 
(2009, 230) points out, in the absence ‘of a shared identity of lifeworld, the 
background conditions for the claim “good people do X” do not exist.’ Leading him 
to document the importance of the sacred to human rights advocacy. His work on AI 
demonstrates the way in which the moral authority deployed by the organization is 
maintained though its separation from the “political” as a sphere of contest, interest 
and power. The “activist” working selflessly and in the name of morality for the 
realization of human rights has no need for a critical praxis, as the moral law, in the 
form of human rights, is there to be carried out. 
 
We argue that the assumption that there are stable and easily knowable global 
norms depends upon the legislative conception of human rights critiqued above. 
Where we differ from Hopgood is in examining alternative conceptions of moral 
authority and radical forms of political advocacy. In much of the work on 
transnational human rights networks the content of liberal human rights norms is 
assumed, and the effect of moral norms mobilized by transnational actors on state-
centric political structures is documented without analyzing what is actually said and 
who speaks (Robinson 2003). It is this closure of the reflective process, the lack of 
praxis, which we find problematic. It is not that reflection is not happening in tandem 
with political action – in fact below we draw on a number of scholars that analyze this 
process – what we are suggesting is that the dominant understanding of human rights, 
as philosophy and political action, continues to ignore this rich world of praxis.  
 
For the “activist” the central question is how to ensure that human rights are 
enforced. There is a sense of impatience with philosophical reflection when people 
are suffering human rights abuses – there are too many people being killed, tortured, 
starved, imprisoned and abused to devote our energies to the endless pondering of the 
meaning of human rights. This is not to suggest that this ideal figure is fanatical, but 
rather inclined towards action and skeptical of a concern for philosophical debate in a 
world with so many problems. Hopgood (2006, 7) points to the relative anonymity of 
John Rawls within AI, suggesting that ‘we might ask what all those students of 
political philosophy are doing if their work has no impact on the world? They 
certainly are not providing a ground for human rights activists.’ The understanding of 
human rights for the “activist” is determinate, and while sharing the “philosopher’s” 
understanding of the relation between morality and politics, it expresses greater 
confidence in an achieved consensus on human rights, and the power of legalization 
and institutionalization to take that work forward. The “activist’s” reflection is 
constrained by the framing of morality and politics written into the universal human 
rights norms she embraces – the “activist’s” practice, but not her moral principles, are 
open for reflection.  
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In drawing the “activist” perspective we are primarily concerned with 
distinctively international NGOs, those that are self-consciously cosmopolitan and see 
the defense of human rights as a global project. This is not a restatement of the 
global/local divide but it does point to the difference between groups working in 
localized polities while taking part in a global discourse, and those engaged in a 
global politics with localized campaigns. If we take the activism of big human rights 
NGOs, in particular AI and Oxfam, we see the both repeated evocations of the moral 
authority of human rights and a practical approach to furthering the human rights 
regime.  
 
AI (2010a), for instance, advocates ‘for internationally recognized human 
rights for all’, declaring that their members are ‘outraged by human rights abuses but 
inspired by hope for a better world’ and that they ‘work to improve human rights 
through campaigning and international solidarity.’ The human rights expressed in 
international human rights documents provide the means for AI to meet its moral 
aspirations. In achieving these rights they see the best hope for the betterment of 
people around the world, and so of the world as a whole. Having traditionally focused 
on civil and political rights, in 2001 AI (2010b) incorporated economic, cultural and 
social rights into its mandate, affirming a comprehensive and increasingly mainstream 
account of international human rights. The key strategies of AI are petitioning 
governments to respect rights, mobilizing public opinion and building international 
solidarity around human rights. These activities not only depend upon a depoliticized 
moral authority, but they also exclude the reflections of those directly affected by 
human rights abuses. This means that human rights discourse structures particular 
abuses as human rights abuses, but particular abuses do not in turn inform human 
rights standards (Jackson 2007). ‘Victims must, therefore, be vulnerable and suffering 
bodies rather than political persons’ (Merry 2007, 198). This is also seen in 
mainstream human rights NGOs’ unwillingness to challenge the dominance of the 
nation-state or the global hegemony of free-market liberalism – it becomes an article 
of faith that human rights can be protected if the state system and the market work 
properly12 because the conventional rights holder is a particular type of citizen and 
property owner (Leve 2007, 98-99). What escapes notice are the ways in which 
certain groups are excluded and the kind of political claims that go unacknowledged 
despite the use of human rights as an idea and discourse in these movements, which 
we illustrate below by looking at the Zapatistas and MST. 
 
Unlike AI, Oxfam’s campaigning is more focused on economic rights, even as 
they recognize and support both first and second-generation human rights. There are 
two possible and indeed simultaneous readings of their position. On the one hand they 
affirm that ‘respect for human rights will help lift people out of poverty and injustice, 
allow them to assert their dignity and guarantee sustainable development’ (Oxfam 
2010). In this statement there seems to be a higher end: the end of poverty, 
powerlessness and inequality so that people can have control over their lives and live 
sustainably and free from want. In this way human rights are seen as instruments 
                                                
12 The key fault line of debate here is whether the current international political and economic order is 
part of a progressive liberal process of modernization or if human rights amount to little more than an 
ideology for contemporary constellations of social power. This debate can be traced in the exchange 
between Paul O’Connoll and Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann. See, Howard-Hassmann (2005), O’Connell 
(2007); and their exchange in Howard-Hassmann (2009) and O’Connell (2009). 
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towards a higher moral aim. On the other hand, Oxfam (1996) claims that they are 
demanding basic human rights, based on essential needs that must be met. In this way, 
human rights themselves are an important aspiration even as they are part of a broader 
vision of global justice.  
 
Their commitment to human rights as a campaigning framework has provided 
Oxfam with a mainstream appeal and a nominally impartial agenda. Even when they 
claim that there are structural problems that cause poverty, they do not offer a critique 
of capitalism, or the international power structure. In a statement for the G-20 meeting 
in London 2009, Oxfam (2008, para.2) claimed: 
 
Aid is urgently needed to address the immediate threat to poor people 
posed by higher food prices but money is not enough. World leaders 
must take this opportunity to address structural problems such as under-
investment in agriculture and unfair trade rules, which are exacerbating 
the problem. 
 
The demands placed on world leaders gives us a few hints of what it means to 
campaign for human rights. Firstly, there is an acknowledgement that human rights 
are granted by governments and therefore they are responsible for protecting and 
providing them. Secondly, Oxfam maintains an un-threatening impartial position in 
the eyes of powerful ‘world leaders’ by acknowledging their power and capacity to 
realize these rights. There is no questioning, as we see from the more radical groups 
discussed below, of the willingness of governments to grant rights, of the limitations 
of those very rights, or the implications of demanding certain rights and not others. 
The image of human rights organizations as impartial and apolitical against the image 
of other groups as agenda-driven and ideological is a key feature of human rights 
NGOs and transnational activists. 
 
Two important features of the “activist” perspective are, first, the move from 
humanitarian to human rights oriented international NGOs, and, second, a trend of 
transnational activists working with governments. The political constraints of the 
Cold War effectively stifled human rights as an international political project and the 
work of many NGOs was framed in limited humanitarian terms. It was the sudden end 
of the ideological and military contest between the superpowers that not only 
increased the space for human rights groups but also facilitated collaboration between 
powerful states and NGOs (Chandler 2001). As US hegemony was increasingly 
justified, in part, through human rights discourse the moral power drawn upon by 
human rights activists became inseparable, and in many cases subservient, to 
dominant political forces. It is this marriage of human rights morality and liberal 
hegemony that critics of human rights accuse of being both unreflective and coercive, 
but it also enables the moralism of both the “philosopher” defending rational agency 
and the “activist” seeking to institutionalize liberal rights at the international level.  
 
The development of human rights as ideology is furthered by human rights 
activism that reinforces the power of the state. Keck and Sikkink, for instance, while 
challenging the realist idea that states are the only actors in international relations that 
matter, actually remain committed to the state. They explain that when the channels of 
negotiation between domestic groups and the government are blocked, these groups, 
especially NGOs, search for support from other states and international organizations 
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that then apply pressure on the offending state (Keck & Sikkink 1998). Transnational 
networks challenge the authority of particular states, mobilizing transnational NGOs, 
international organizations and interested states, but in the process redeem the state 
(in general) as the appropriate and necessary defender of human rights (Risse, Ropp, 
& Sikkink 1999). Human rights standards reinforce “good” states by disciplining 
“bad” ones. Further, the success of transnational human rights advocacy is assessed 
on its ability to reform states, a standard that precludes many types of advocacy – 
such as in the examples below, where groups affirm violent resistance to the state and 
challenge the legitimacy of legal property ownership. By staying within the dominant 
framework of human rights, we are not able to understand important aspects of human 
rights practice. Not only can they be used to justify the liberal international order, but 
they also support relationships of power (particularly between state and subject, and 
global economy and producer/consumer) that, for many, are the cause of human rights 
abuses. To see beyond this conceptualization of human rights and to challenge the 
politics it reinforces, we need to engage with radical critics and activists in their 
rejection of hegemonic accounts of human rights and their articulation of different 
notions of political legitimacy and order. 
 
4. Radical Critique and Activism 
 
Thus far, we have argued that the way human rights are understood keeps 
moral reflection and political action separate. Further, we suggest that this separation 
results from a problematic understanding of the relationship between politics and 
morality, and legitimates a coercive international order. We share these criticisms 
with many others, but we seek to move beyond critique and try to see the work of 
human rights differently, arguing that a focus on the activities of translation and 
reconstruction of human rights as they are put to use in diverse ways can transform 
the always present ‘danger’ of human rights escaping the control of powerful actors 
and ‘working in a genuinely emancipatory way’ (Merry 2006, 231) into an alternative 
understanding of human rights. 
 
Critics of human rights have identified the divide between morality and 
politics as a key point of contention. For Evans (2005; 1998, 17) the imposition of an 
essentially liberal universalism not only excludes moral principle from serious 
contestation but also makes morality a technical legal problem. In a similar vein 
Costas Douzinas (2006) points to the way human rights, as the moral principle 
underlying the liberal international order, obscures the sovereign power that makes 
this possible. This results not only in imposition of a particular vision of morality and 
humanity as a cosmopolitan universal, but also justifies policies that knowingly lead 
to economic deprivation and inequality and various forms of legalized violence, such 
as bombing campaigns, humanitarian wars and economic sanctions. Human rights are 
criticized for perpetuating an image of the civilized West that must educate the savage 
colonial “other” – not only does this feed on lingering racism but it points to the 
imposition of cosmopolitan ideals of secularism, individuality, and universalism 
(Mutua 2002, Rana 2007). Yet critique often ends with calls for a global ethic that 
allows for greater diversity, whether this comes about by way of revising the human 
rights regime or turning to some alternative ethics.  
 
     We argue that looking to the reality of social struggles, especially those not 
sanctioned by mainstream human rights bodies, provides important insight for 
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reconstructing rights. This praxis becomes possible when we abandon the 
understanding of rights as a moral law that legislates universally – whether in the 
form of the “good state” or some universal sovereign (Pagden, 2003). A move made 
possible by reconnecting the moral and the political, which allows us to acknowledge 
that declaring moral values is an expression of power, but not one that can only result 
in an authoritarian politics. Understanding human rights in this way requires us to 
embrace the agonism at the heart of moral and political life – the contestation of 
values is ongoing and the central question is how do we make contestation bearable 
and productive. Connolly (2005, 122), provides an initial formulation claiming that 
the  
 
virtues commended [agonistic respect and critical responsiveness] here 
do not take politics out of ethics, nor do they rise above politics… They 
speak to a world in which people draw upon different final sources of 
ethical sustenance and bring those sources with them into politics. 
 
Acknowledging the persistence, and even productivity, of moral contestation does not 
make a distinction between good and bad politics impossible, but it does undermine 
the moral authority of final rational principles and the forms of political order they 
support. 
 
Beginning with this revised understanding of moral authority, acknowledging it 
as an expression of power and affirming its contestability, reframes the story we tell 
about human rights. Firstly, this reframing unearths the politics of human rights, 
which are defined by a certain type of moral demand upon social and political 
structures. The American and French revolutions are usually cast as important 
moments in the evolution of human rights, but what we want to emphasize is the 
connection between these supposedly self-evident rights and political movements to 
achieve them. Secondly, to claim rights are possessed because one is “human” is a 
challenge to the existing order, as the referent category is ambiguous and open to 
contestation by anyone, even those not recognized in the social order. This is evident 
in the way in which oppressed groups in America and France picked up the rhetoric of 
rights immediately; women, Jews, and slaves recognized their own humanity, even if 
their oppressors did not, and made their own claims to be recognized as human, 
claims not only for inclusion but claims that contested the meaning of “human,” or 
more accurately: man (Hunt 2007, 146-175; Grovogui 2009). We can continue to tell 
this history as the tragedy of universal values unable to overcome social oppression, 
but we feel it is far more productive, especially in our current age of human rights 
dominance, to look to the contests that are always present when the ambiguous human 
category is invoked. 
 
Neil Stammers (1999, 2009) has developed this idea of human rights, in which 
the claim to social power is made through the ambiguous category of “humanity,” and 
both recasts the international human rights movement and reveals potentials for 
opposition and counter-hegemonic ideas. This account is based on an understanding 
of rights as moral claims that define the legitimacy of an existing political order, and 
human rights become, potentially, the most radical and coercive type of rights claims. 
The category of humanity is ambiguous because it can be taken up by anyone. The 
logic of human rights empower everyone to challenge any existing constellation of 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 16 
power, but they likewise enable the imposition of a new or expanded power over 
everyone (Van Den Hemel 2008).  
 
Human rights are contingent expressions and products of the social struggles in 
which they arose, leaving many issues unaddressed. Article 4 of the UDHR, 
prohibiting slavery, is not the product of the enlightened reason of the delegates in 
1948, but principally, the result of slaves’ resistance and anti-slavery campaigners 
fighting to destroy the moral legitimacy of a shameful trade. Still, for the Sub-Saharan 
Africans growing tropical fruits in the hot houses in Southern Spain, slavery has not 
finished and it is only part of market illogic. By connecting human rights to social 
movements and seeing the claim of these rights as an effort to disrupt the social order, 
the central figure becomes the “radical”. This final figure is defined both by an 
embrace of praxis and an activism explicitly aimed at challenging and changing the 
established political order.13 
 
Increasingly, scholars have turned to the practices of human rights.14 The 
implication of this work is that human rights are not static claims; even in the 
legalized form of international law documents, human rights undergo 
‘vernacularization’ as they are put to use (Merry 2006a, 2006b). In this process 
institutions and interpretations of human rights are developed within a context of 
existing meanings, practices and political struggles. This perspective also recasts the 
transnational hierarchy that gives rise to analyses of the diffusion of norms from the 
global to the local (Goodale 2007, 10-23). Not only are human rights put to use in a 
diversity of ways, but practices and meanings transfer among groups horizontally and 
at times from local to the global. Explicitly connecting this understanding of human 
rights practice to an agonistic ethic of human rights provides new opportunities for 
analyzing the ways that human rights practices enable and constrain individuals and 
groups to effect their social and political environment, and promotes an ethic that is 
critically responsive15 to those actors resisting and contesting to hegemonic structures 
and identities (Connolly 2005, 126) – such as the neo-liberal state, as we will examine 
in the case of the Zapatistas, or the possessive individual, in the case of MST. 
 
One of the main differences between the “activist” understanding of human 
right (so to speak) and the understanding of the “radical” is the difference between 
what Richard Day (2005) calls the ‘politics of demand’ against the ‘politics of the 
act’. If the big NGOs have been professionalized in order to create an extensive 
infrastructure that has the capacity to demand and negotiate with governments for the 
realization of rights as they have been granted and are expressed in different 
covenants; radical movements emphasize their capacity to empower themselves, to 
                                                
13 Feminist work on human rights, as both practice and ethics, has been at the forefront of efforts to 
connect human right theory to activism. This rich contribution is not directly drawn on here for 
practical reasons of space and focus. See Ackerly (2008), Reilly (2007), and Merry (2006b). 
14 Very significantly and close to the kind of claims we are making in this article is the work from 
critical anthropology on the translation of human rights from one cultural context to another (Eg. 
Goodale 2006; Graebber 2009) 
15 Connolly defines critical responsiveness as ‘the form of careful listening and presumptive generosity 
to constituencies struggling to move from an obscure or degraded subsistence below the field of 
recognitions, justice, obligation, rights, or legitimacy to a place on one or more of those registers. 
When a place is created new terms of contrast and similarity become available and the entire register is 
altered to some degree’ (2005, 126).  
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create their own rights, to reinvent power relations and take what they think belongs 
rightfully to them. This is illustrated, with different levels of intensity, by examining 
two Latin American movements: the Zapatistas and the MST. We will first consider 
them separately, to see where they are coming from and to more clearly analyze their 
similarities and differences. 
 
The ‘Zapatistas’, as identification, is an inexact term. It refers to a large 
movement that now includes not only the original group that in 1994 took up arms 
against the Mexican government, the EZLN, but also a extensive world wide network 
of solidarity under the rubric of ‘La Zezta’.16 Since the uprising of 1994, which lasted 
barely twelve days, the Zapatistas have been working towards the self-management of 
their communities and creating new forms of political community. As Subcomandante 
Marcos stated, 
 
Zapatismo is not an ideology… it is… an intuition… Zapatismo poses the 
question: “What is it that has excluded me?” “What is it that has isolated 
me?”… In each place the response is different. Zapatismo simply states 
the question and stipulates that the response is plural, that the response is 
inclusive… (Subcomandante Marcos cited in Carrigan 2001, 440)  
 
Graffiti in San Cristobal de las Casas put it succinctly: ‘We Are Not 
Guerrillas. We are Revolutionaries’ (Carrigan 2001, 440). This also means that the 
Zapatistas are not an armed group attempting to take control of the government or 
separatists with the intention of controlling a part of the country. In fact, since those 
few days in 1994, the EZLN has only used arms to protect their communities against 
the army and paramilitary groups. A communiqué drafted in response to a statement 
from armed Spanish separatist group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), that dismissed 
the EZLN as not revolutionary, made clear many of their political positions and 
especially their approach to armed struggle: 
 
Our struggle has an honor code, inherited from our warrior ancestors and that 
entails, amongst other things, the respect for the life of civilians... not to resort 
to crime to attain our aims… and not to respond with fire to words… Our 
enemies (who are many and not in Mexico alone) wish that we resorted to 
those aims. Nothing would be better for them than that the EZLN turned into 
an indigenous Mexican version of ETA. Unfortunately for them, it is not like 
that, and it will not be… Maybe it is already obvious, but I should emphasize: 
I shit on all revolutionary vanguards of this planet. (EZLN – Subcomandante 
Marcos 2003)17 
 
Their identity is explicitly tied to the history of Mexico and its indigenous heritage. 
However, it also has other more recent political connections.  
 
                                                
16 La Zezta conflates the Sixth Declaration (shorten to ‘la sexta’ in Spanish) and the ‘Z’ of Zapatista. 
This declaration put conditions to those supporting the Zapatistas, declaring that they did not want the 
support, in fact, they were opposed, to political parties, reformist unions and all those organizations that 
did not truly worked for changing the world and for the end of neoliberalism.  
17 All Spanish language citations have been translated by the authors. 
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The name, Zapatistas, comes from collectivist anarchist Emiliano Zapata, who 
led an indigenous-peasant revolution together with Pancho-Villa against the dictator 
Porfirio Díaz under a common cry of ‘land and freedom’. The Zapatistas’ immediate 
background is the 1950s, when indigenous people and peasants attempted to organize 
community structures of self-government in the rural areas of East Chiapas (Stahler-
Sholk 2005, 35). This created a conflict, sometimes violent, between the peasant-
indigenous movement and landowners, which the government was not resolving 
(Wickham-Crowley 1987, 481). Later in the 1970s, this incipient movement 
developed into a small guerrilla movement, attempting to provide protection for 
peasants and indigenous communities from the landowners. It was not, however, until 
the 1990s when the groups, emerging from these series of processes, took the name of 
Zapatistas or EZLN, simultaneously expanding their activities to include the fostering 
of community-controlled services, such as vaccination campaigns and rural schools 
(Carrigan 2001, 426).  
 
Another landmark in the history of the Zapatistas was the transformation of 
the ideological basis of the Mexican state in the 1970s, when Mexico’s Revolutionary 
Institutional Party (PRI), after more than seven decades in power with a populist 
turned to a neo-liberalism one (PRI 2010; Oliver Costilla, Barragán Alvarez and Pérez 
2000). However, it was the 1982 debt crisis, when the International Monetary Fund, 
the World Bank, the US Treasury and the new Mexican president Miguel de la 
Madrid joined forces to introduce emergency economic reforms to get Mexico out of 
the crisis, that precipitated the full turn to neo-liberalism. These measures included 
broad privatizations, ‘opening internal markets to foreign capital, lower tariffs and a 
more flexible labour market.’ (Harvey 2005, 99 – 100)  Mexico then joined GATT, 
reorganized its economy around foreign business interests and introduced laws to 
foster land privatization, all of which clashed with the claims of indigenous peoples 
who wanted more autonomy and self-government of their communal lands and 
resources. 
 
On the 1st January 1994 the EZLN broke into seven cities in Chiapas at the 
same time, declaring war against the Mexican government. This brief war caught the 
world’s attention and pushed the human rights of indigenous communities into the 
spotlight. In the Declaration of Motivations and Principles of the EZLN, they declared 
that they did not aim to take power, but to draw attention to the need to review the 
political system in Mexico and to the situation of poverty, marginalization and abuse 
of human rights experienced by thousands of indigenous people (EZLN 1993, 1994). 
They demanded a democratic regime for Mexico, the recognition of all indigenous 
peoples of Mexico and the participation of all people in ruling the country.  
 
In this First declaration they did not demand human rights. Instead, they 
appealed to the Mexican constitution, declared that as belligerent combatants the laws 
of the Geneva Conventions and international humanitarian law bound them and stated 
their adherence to constitutional rights and universal principles of justice and equality 
(EZLN 1993, para.8). They specified their demands by calling for the cessation of the 
‘genocidal war’ against indigenous peoples in Mexico, as well as for ‘jobs, land, 
housing, food, health, education, independence, freedom, democracy, justice and 
peace’ (Ibid, para.16). Finally, they declared that they would not stop fighting until 
those basic demands were fulfilled ‘by forming a free and democratic government’ 
(Ibid). This is similar to the set of rights established in the UDHR, but it is at the same 
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time a radical take on these ideas. Here the important thing to note is that while the 
Zapatistas might actually appeal to sovereign bodies, or recognise and abide by 
international law and even ‘universal’ principles of justice, they act upon their own 
understanding of their rights and responsibilities. 
 
The Zapatistas use the notion of rights in a way that challenges many of the 
assumptions infused in the International Bill of rights. In 1994, justifying and 
clarifying the EZLN uprising they stated, 
 
Our path of fire sprang out of the impossibility of struggling peacefully for 
our elemental rights as human beings. The most valuable of these rights is the 
right to decide, freely and democratically, what form the government will take 
(EZLN 1994a, para.26). 
 
At least three crucial concepts come out of this statement. Firstly, the emphasis on 
their humanity, secondly the emphasis is not on the realization of rights granted by the 
state, but rather on the collective control over political life in which rights can be 
achieved, finally, the idea of challenging the meanings of democracy, justice and 
freedom as both a way of reinterpreting them and as a confrontation of the injustices 
they suffer. Let us examine these more closely. 
 
Their emphasis on humanity is a way of critiquing neo-liberalism and 
capitalism as dehumanizing forces. Speaking of Chiapas, they regretted that 
‘everyday… they take away the petroleum and gas and, in exchange, leave behind the 
mark of capitalism: ecological destruction, agricultural plunder, hyperinflation, 
alcoholism, prostitution, and poverty’ (EZLN cited in Ponce de León 2001, 124). The 
Zapatistas declare their opposition to neo-liberalism because it symbolizes death, 
wars, weapons, dictatorships, repression, poverty, corruption, patriarchy, racism, 
crime, environmental destruction, ignorance, manipulation and injustice (cited in 
Ponce de León 2001, 124).18 On the contrary, they affirm an ‘international order of 
hope, new politics, democracy, dignified work, full rights for women, respect for 
elders, defense and protection of the environment, intelligence, culture, education, 
truth, freedom… for remembrance, and concluded: for humanity’ (Ibid). That is, the 
appeal to humanity is not a way of essentializing the human being across the world, 
but to defend humanity, in its full diversity, with its potential for creativity, its 
connection to the environment and its social, political and rational needs as a different 
set of values from that of the universalized capitalist logic of competitiveness, 
consumerism and accumulation.  
 
Their radical emphasis on self-determination is not a way of seceding from the 
state, but a conviction that they need to be in control of their own affairs, because they 
have a fundamental right to decide their own form of government. Ever since the 
1994 uprising, the Zapatistas have been focused on self-managing their communities 
and after 16 years they are implanted in over 40 municipalities, which they administer 
following their own political principles.19 For them, a good government is one that 
                                                
18 For the full elaboration of these categories see Ponce de León (2001, 124). 
19 This does not mean a full administration or a complete implantation but sometimes a presence and a 
juxtaposition of difference authorities together with government representatives. The Zapatista 
municipalities are federated into five Assemblies of Good Government (Juntas de Buen Gobierno).  
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‘commands obeying’, a sort of Aristotelian concept of ruling and being ruled; 
decisions are taken collectively in directly democratic assemblies; and the economy is 
driven by a collective desire to live with dignity and sustainably.20 They emphasize 
their capacity to rule over their own affairs, which is in itself how they see the 
realization of justice and the only framework for their rights – this should be 
distinguished from other movements for indigenous political autonomy based on 
multicultural grounds and inclusion in a distinctive culture identity. 
 
  A quick example of a recent event can exemplify this more clearly. On 
November 25, 2009, the newspaper La Jornada published an article detailing how the 
Chiapas Congress had agreed to discuss in parliament a claim placed by the Zapatistas 
to be recognized by the government. Throughout the following day all five Zapatistas 
Assemblies of Good Government (Oventik, La Garrucha, Morelia, La Realidad y 
Roberto Barrios) responded that this was absolutely false, that they are recognized by 
the people that support them and that they will never ask to be recognized by ‘bad 
governments’. They argued that they would never authorize the ‘bad government of 
Mexico to make/impose laws over our rights and indigenous culture’ (Junta de Buen 
Gobierno 2009). They see their rights and culture as deeper political and ethical 
commitments and not as granted by a particular contingent government. Therefore, it 
is a way of saying that they do not believe that the government is the one granting 
them rights nor that they have to wait for the government to recognize their rights, 
they create them. 
 
This refusal to seek state recognition is something that separates the Zapatistas 
from many other radical social movements. For instance the MST follows a tactic of 
direct action in regards to their land claims, but they still seek recognition from the 
government to secure a legal and final acquisition of land. They assert their right to 
land based on their socially productive use of it rather than on private ownership. 
They occupy the land and then demand the government provide a legal entitlement 
that legalizes ownership of the land for the working families. Still, the contestability 
of rights is present as the MST uses the language of human rights to make demands of 
the government, to denounce the activities of big agro-corporations and other actors 
they campaign against.  
 
The MST was established in 1984 out of the struggles of rural workers in the 
1970s, an opening of Brazil’s economy in the aftermath of the military dictatorship, 
and the germination of Liberation Theology (Gutiérrez 1974).21 Its origins and present 
activities are based on the struggle for meaningful agrarian reform, which seeks to 
distribute land amongst landless rural workers. The MST claims to have grown to be 
‘the largest social movement in Latin America with an estimated 1.5 million landless 
members organized in 23 of 27 states’ (MST 2010a, para.1).22 According to Wolford 
                                                
20 Dignity for the Zapatistas seems to be a sense of satisfaction, pride in being rebellious and control of 
one’s own life in community with those around you. This is an important principle in the Zapatista 
communities, which are organized around the principle of participation and collective horizontal 
decision-making processes. Their economic organization follows ideas of sustainability, satisfying the 
needs of the community in a way that is environmentally sustainable. This has been sometimes called 
‘social ecology’ See Toledo 1999 and Harvey 2005. 
21 Liberation Theology is based on the premise that poverty is a sin and that Christians must work 
towards a society of justice and solidarity. 
22 All Portuguese language citations have been translated by the authors.  
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and Wright, the MST is a story of ‘more than a million people [who] by organizing 
peaceful protests have forced the Brazilian government to redistribute twenty million 
acres of agricultural land to 350.000 families and to assist them further in creating 
new livelihoods’ (2003, xiii). For the MST, the access to land is the realization of 
justice in that it has the capacity to improve levels of wealth distribution, reduce 
poverty and empower working families. 
 
Brazil is a country of immense resource wealth but also dramatic inequalities. 
This is why land, as the primary resource for agriculture, is the target. In Brazil, not 
only does ‘one per cent of the population have 13 per cent of the total household 
income’, but also regarding land distribution, ‘the percentage of the total area 
occupied’ by the top deciles of properties ‘is approximately 78 percent’  (Beghin 
2008, 1). However, the redistribution of land clashes with the biggest industries in 
Brazil: agriculture, cattle, bio-fuels, paper and pharmaceuticals. All of these industries 
are based on mono-crops, land clearing and more so, they carry out their business on 
big land extensions, concentrating wealth in the hands of a few. Monsanto, one of the 
biggest multinational companies23 in Brazil, is, for the MST, a symbol of what they 
are against: big land owners, concentration of land in a few hands,  and in foreign 
agro-business imposing on farmers the purchase of Monsanto seeds that do not 
produce seeds. Not surprisingly, MST members on more than a few occasions have 
targeted Monsanto (BBC 2003).  
 
In opposition to this vivid example, the MST communities grow organic crops 
and distribute the harvest equally amongst members of the communities.24 They 
attempt to apply, in the settlements, the ideals of empowering all members of the 
settlement, putting emphasis on equal participation, gender equality and raising 
political consciousness, as well as providing education for everyone (not just basic 
education but also political education). However, the practice of land occupation and 
land collectivization entails dramatic risks, including repression, prison and even 
murder. This is why the MST recently created a human rights commission that is part 
of every federated division within the organization (MST 2009a, 2010b). The MST 
human rights commission attempts to carry out not just campaigning but actually take 
abuses of human rights to court. The occupying workers receive constant death threats 
from different fronts including corporations, landowners and government security 
forces (MST 2001). For example, the commission heard about a recent threat to the 
workers occupying land in Alagoas, part of the municipal locality of Belo Monte in 
which a number of men with guns, supposedly linked to the owner of the land, 
threatened to kill the workers and force them off of the property (2009b). The report 
about it on the MST website was under the title ‘Disrespect for human rights in 
Alagoas.’ 
 
So although the MST sees their human rights as being served better by 
pushing the boundaries of legality, they do not completely reject the state framework 
of human rights, but rather make a strategic use of it to demand accountability from 
the government, demanding both security and redistribution, but while occupying land 
“illegally” and demanding radical changes to the economic order. Additionally, it is 
through language such as ‘disrespect for human rights in Alagoas’ that they have a 
                                                
23 Monsanto (2009, 4) declared reported profit sales for a value of  $6.762 million in 2009. 
24 For a more detailed and deeper background see for example Dias Martins 2006. 
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more international appeal, using a common international discourse. The MST might 
not be, as David Graebber observes, entirely ‘rejecting a politics which appeals to 
governments to modify their behavior’ but they are still ‘in favor of physical 
intervention against state power in a form that itself prefigures an alternative’ (cited in 
Day 2005, 19). 
 
The relationship between the big NGOs and radical groups deserves some 
mention, as it clarifies the different approaches to human rights. AI is very careful not 
to show direct support or sympathy for the Zapatista struggle. The way that AI (2000) 
reports on this is to focus on the victims as a ‘third party’, describing villagers or 
indigenous communities that innocently find themselves in between the EZLN and 
the paramilitary or government forces. Yet, while they would never support the 
EZLN’s right to forcefully defend their rights, they are happy to call on the 
government (usually a human rights violator in the region) to protect these 
communities. The case scenario in Brazil is different and AI (1999, 2009) has 
produced communiqués demanding protection for MST members - whereas the case 
of the Zapatistas is not mentioned in the latest AI (2007, 2008, 2009) reports. 
However, the human rights violations reported focused on threats to the security and 
life of the peasants but nothing was said in support of their claims to land. Oxfam has 
been working in Chiapas for a while, and continues to do so by supporting local 
organizations and projects that work in the area, specifically with economic programs 
broadly related to development and gender issues. Although they have written 
extensively on the negative impact of the NAFTA on peoples of Chiapas, they also 
emphasize that they help ‘communities’ in Chiapas, whether Zapatistas or not (Oxfam 
2006). The point here is not to assert which party is right; it is just to say that 
upholding the human rights flag is not a neutral or non-political act. 
 
How does looking at the Zapatistas and MST challenge the understanding of 
human rights that we have been developing here? There are at least two sets of 
challenges in answering this question. One relates to the relationship between the 
theorist and the activist; the other one pertains to the idea and practice of human 
rights. Regarding the first challenge, as Adam David Morton suggests, analyzing 
radical social movements needs to lead us to the questioning of the figure of the 
intellectual and the limits of intellectual activity (2002, 30). Following Nugent, 
Morton highlights that ‘our intellectual activity function[s] as a critical instrument, as 
a challenge to ruling ideologies, maybe as a guide to political action’ (cited in Morton 
2002, 30). Thus, although it might be clear for the philosopher what the benefits of 
entering a conversation with radicals are, it is less clear the other way around, unless, 
as Morton suggests, theory enters the political process in solidarity (2002, 30).  For 
the second challenge, that links directly to the notion of human rights, both the MST 
and the Zapatistas illustrate that any attempts to expand the meaning of rights or to 
construct different relationships on which those rights can have further meaning meets 
with resistance from established power. What these movements also show is that 
human rights depend upon a relationship with power in which, at times, government 
and the state apparatus are simultaneously protectors and transgressors. In the case of 
the Chiapas or Brazil, for example, the government allows the use of the environment 
and resources for the benefit of a foreign multinational corporation, meaning that the 
best the international human rights regime can offer is a low-paid job and consumer 
opportunities. In this situation one could still demand alternative ideas of human 
rights, but this challenge will antagonize the government, and this antagonism meets 
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with repression and marginalization. Human rights, as they have been legislated, 
establish that there must be a legitimate authority that protects those rights, but 
nothing is said about what to do when these rights are not met, much less when those 
rights are inadequate, other than to appeal to further state-centric international 
institutions. Far from human rights acknowledging the asymmetrical hierarchical 
relationships between actors, they attempt to set a standard of justice that can be 
embraced by those left disempowered. Anthony Anghie (2005, 133) argues that the 
human rights architecture recreated the idea of god and the sovereign king as the 
guarantor and source of justice in the modern state. This relationship of king-subject, 
whether that has been transformed into one of government-citizen or not, is the one 
that radical groups question.  
 
This setting of the standards of morality and justice is what is fundamentally 
challenged when rather than demanding, we act (Day 2005).25 The contemporary 
human rights regime allows individuals to organize opposition parties, to march in 
protest, and choose someone else for the job of governing. What the conventional 
understandings of human rights makes it difficult to do is alter the basic structures of 
sovereignty, representative government, and economic decision making in ways that 
challenge a narrow liberal and state-centric ideal. Because this ideal eschews deeper 
critiques of political and social power relations (including those that make the ideal 
possible), human rights do not make space to imagine and create more participatory 
forms of politics, where we can contest, and possibly upset, established social 
structures, and participate more fully in decision making and political action.26 The 
problem is not just having the protector and primary violator of human rights in the 
same institution; it is also that there is not space to contest the ideal of human rights, 
both of in terms of the individual and political community entailed.  
 
Our understanding of rights needs to be open to the process of social 
contestation and alive to the dangers of political moralism. The consecration of power 
via the protection of human rights runs counter to the spirit of the social movements 
that lead to, and perpetuate, the rights discourse – including democratic revolutions, 
slave rebellions, workers’ and women’s movements and decolonization – and, we 
conclude, should be challenged. The practice of human rights is recast by radical 
groups in terms of changing the social world, in terms of what Connolly (2005, 121-
122) terms the ‘politics of becoming.’ The contextualizing of rights or of rights abuses 
then is not about this or that government, but about how power relations are 
constructed. For Holloway, this has been the fundamental challenge posed by the 
Zapatistas: ‘The Zapatistas have said that they want to make the world anew, to create 
a world of dignity, a world of humanity, but without taking power’ (Holloway 2005, 
21). This leads to a theory and practice of rights that seeks to reconstruct social and 
political community on site through the practices of the everyday, without seeking to 
authoritatively control the instruments of government for others – one that is ‘not 
understood in the first instance to be derived from apodictic recognition of its law like 
                                                
25 Note that behind Day’s idea of the ‘politics of the act’ is Lacan’s ‘passage à l’act’ (take action upon a 
sense of anxiety and simply ‘exit’ the kind of power network that generated that anxiety. See Lacan 
(1991)) as well as that of direct action (Rocker 1938).  
26 This is not to suggest that the ideal described here simply needs to replace the conventional account 
of human rights, but to emphasize that the consolidation of any human rights ideal closes off others and 
creates exclusions and silences that are rendered natural or reasonable by the disciplining of political 
life by moral principle. 
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form but rather taken to be inspired in the first instance by a love of the world or 
attachment to the complexity of being that infuses it’ (Connolly 2005, 116). What this 
rather obscure language points to is that ‘Connolly urges us to assess emergent claims 
as democratic theorists and activists should: by imagining and assessing a world, the 
world that might be open by this new right… Here, rights and goods meet.’ (Honig 
2008, 105) 
 
In many ways, the Zapatistas go a step further than the MST, for the MST 
does not have a critique of the state as such, for instance, they saw in president Lula a 
way towards their desired agrarian reform. For the Zapatistas, the diffusion of power 
in autonomous communities and a vision of rights emanating from, and protected 
through, the everyday interactions of their immediate community is a substantive 
improvement over giving away their rights to a powerful, historically oppressive state 
structure that is beyond their control. Yet, these two groups have similar ways of 
acting upon rights – they create them and they act on them – but two different 
understandings of the implications of their actions and two different frameworks of 
action. This relates back to the contours of their own political imagination. Radical 
groups push the boundaries of what documented human rights allow and take what 
they need, what they consider to be fair and just. In the case of both the Zapatistas and 
MST they do this collectively, contextualizing the notions of justice and re-
negotiating the limits in the name of a clearly defined political community. It is also 
in this sense that for them it is more powerful to claim rights as indigenous people, as 
Mexicans or as Brazilian peasants than only as members of humanity. It is not that 
they do not want those rights for everyone or do not refer to their humanity as 
justification, it is that they do not conceive of a specific list of rights that are claimed 
by all humans – the rights they claim are born of the conditions of their lives and the 
ways they have been victimized in a specific context.  
 
The more extreme case is seen in the Zapatistas’ rejection of the Mexican 
government as it is structured and conceived within a global neo-liberal context. They 
see governments as corrupt and democracy as having lost its real sense. However, as 
Richard Day (2005) observes, we would be misled if we read this as counter 
hegemony. Radicals are not attempting to construct themselves as the new power, the 
new government, the new representation of the state, ‘instead, they are driven by an 
orientation to meeting individual/group/community needs by direct action’ (Day 
2005, 45). This orientation informs an alternative conception of human rights, one 
that recognizes that claiming rights is also a claim to remake social structures and 
redistribute political power – not only do radical movements show the limits of the 
established human rights regime, they suggest one way it is possible to think of 
human rights through a prism of plurality and ongoing contestation. 
 
5. Conclusion  
 
Human rights should be seen, we have argued, as the result of a temporary 
settlement of social contestation in which both moral principle and social conditions 
have been challenged. Disconnecting human rights, and moral authority generally, 
from their history, in which political boundaries have been challenged and altered, 
leads to two problematic assumptions. Firstly, that there is a human essence to which 
rights can be ascribed. Secondly, that the enjoyment of such rights entails being 
permanently subject to an authority with the capacity to protect them. The risk of 
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asserting human rights this way and detaching them from historical conditions is to 
reify human rights, as we know them now, into something truthful, eternal, and good 
beyond dispute.  
 
As a result, looking at the social struggles of radical movements, at how they 
push the boundaries of the rights discourse puts human rights in a relative but also 
agonistic light. While human rights still serve as a language amongst the less 
powerful, while human rights are recognized as victories of previous struggles, and 
while for some, their enjoyment would truly mean better conditions of life, these 
radical movements also see the limitations in demanding only what is written because 
they see the limitations of the given. They do not just protest that their governments 
are not complying with their obligations; they are stating that the nature of the 
political and economic structure is not conducive to the enjoyment of such rights and 
that established rights are inadequate.  
 
We can extract two important conclusions regarding the theory and practice of 
human rights. On the one hand, that the ‘politics of demand’ are limited and the 
articulation of more critical claims requires a ‘passage à l’act’, the reconstruction and 
creation of rights, the pushing of political boundaries, the denunciation of the 
weaknesses and injustices in the framework in which human rights are embedded. On 
the other hand, that one of the most fundamental flaws of this theory and practice of 
human rights is the division of politics from morality. Identifying an alternative social 
logic to human rights, one based in an ethic of agonism rather than a morality of 
legislation, carries its own commitments. Importantly, it takes uncertainty and 
ambiguity as potentially productive conditions for ethics, while privileging certain 
values – two of which are of particular importance. First, human rights should protect 
those marginalized and disempowered by existing politics. Further, human rights 
should be linked to a democratic ethos that does not demand uniform processes of 
state building, but instead supports efforts to establish more participatory and plural 
forms of democratic government in order to combat the tendency of universal claims 
to become coercive and exclusionary.  
 
These commitments are intended to preserve the agonistic element of human 
rights and to resist the temptations of imposition or antagonism. But, importantly, 
these values reflect a politics of their own, but one we think fruitfully enabled by 
human rights discourse. In addition, these commitments have real political 
consequences – human rights, we argue, are tools put to work to achieve particular 
social ends (Langlois 2002), and while they also help to generate a human politics that 
is increasingly important in an interconnected world, human rights should be allowed 
greater plurality both in meaning and institution. The connection between theory and 
practice is of great importance here; if human rights can serve the goal of inclusion 
and make our human politics more democratic the ”radical” combining political 
action and philosophical reflection is a key figure. Finally, in linking human rights to 
social movements and calling for greater plurality we open the door to alternative 
political and economic orders that will challenge current powers. Not only should the 
state and free-market be open to challenge, but also the way in which social conflicts 
play out may not always be peaceful. Those willing to consider humanitarian war to 
protect human rights should not be too quick to oppose the use of violence by other 
social movements in extreme circumstances. 
 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 26 
Works Cited 
Ackerly, Brooke A., 2008. Universal Human Rights in a World of Difference. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 
 
Afshari, Reza, 2007. On Historiography of Human Rights Reflections on Paul Gordon 
Lauren’s The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen. Human Rights 
Quarterly, 29 (1), pp. 1-67.  
 
Amnesty International, 1999. Brazil: Fear for safety/Torture, 8 April 1999. [Online] 
Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR19/011/1999/en/5986f271-e1e1-11dd-
a03a-6b5b1e49bce3/amr190111999en.html [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Amnesty International, 2000. Mexico: Fear for safety for Indigenous communities in 
the municipality of Chenalhó, 14 November 2000. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AMR41/059/2000/en/ffe4b8f0-dd04-11dd-
a007-3753b71c3d78/amr410592000en.html [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Amnesty International, 2007. Annual Report. Available in: 
http://archive.amnesty.org/report2007/eng/Homepage [Accessed 14 April 2010] 
 
Amnesty International, 2008. Annual Report. [Online] Available in: 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/region/mexico/report-2009; 
http://thereport.amnesty.org/en/regions/americas/mexico [Accessed 07 February 
2010] 
 
Amnesty International, 2009. Annual Report 2009: The state of the world’s human 
rights. [Online] Available at: http://thereport.amnesty.org/fr/regions/americas/brazil 
[Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Amnesty International, 2010a. Who We Are. [Online] Available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Amnesty International, 2010b. The history of Amnesty International. [Online] 
Available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/who-we-are/history [Accessed 07 February 
2010]. 
 
Anghie, Anthony, 2005. Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International 
Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Baynes, Kenneth, 2009. Toward a Political Conception of Human Rights. Philosophy 
& Social Criticism, 35 (4), pp.371-390. 
 
BBC, 2003. Brazil activists target Monsanto, 3 June, 2003. [Online] Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2961284.stm 3jun03 [Accessed 07 February 
2010]. 
 
Beghin, Nathalie, 2008. ‘Notes on Inequality and Poverty in Brazil: Current Situation 
and Challenges’ in From Poverty to Power: How Active Citizens and Effective States 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 27 
Can Change the World. New York: Oxfam International.[Online] Available at: 
http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/downloads/FP2P/FP2P_Brazil_Inequality_Povert
y_BP_ENGLISH.pdf  [Accessed 27 June 2010]. 
 
Beitz, Charles, 2003. What Human Rights Mean. Daedalus, 132 (1), pp.36-46. 
 
Benhabib, Seyla, 2006. Another Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Benhabib, Seyla, 2008. The legitimacy of human rights. Daedalus, 137 (3), pp.94-
104. 
 
Benhabib, Seyla, 2009. Claiming Rights across Borders: International Human Rights 
and Democratic Sovereignty. American Political Science Review, 103 (4), pp.691 
-704. 
 
Bhambra, Gurminder K. & Shilliam, Robbie, eds., 2009. Introduction: 'Silence' and 
Human Rights. Bhambra, Gurminder K. & Shilliam, Robbie, eds., 2009. Silencing 
Human Rights: Critical Engagements with a Contested Project. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp.1-16. 
 
Bufacchi, Vittorio, 2008. The Truth About Rights. Journal of Human Rights, 7 (4), 
pp. 311-326. 
 
Carrigan, Anna, 2001. Chiapas, The First Postmodern Revolution. In Juana Ponce de 
León, ed. Our Word is Our Weapon: Selected writings by Subcomandante Marcos. 
London: Serpent’s Tail, 2001, 417 – 44. 
 
Chandler, David, 2001. The Road to Military Humanitarianism: How the Human 
Rights NGOs Shaped a New Humanitarian Agenda. Human Rights Quarterly, 23 (3), 
pp.678-700.  
 
Charvet, John & Kaczynska-Nay, Elisa, 2008. The Liberal Project and Human 
Rights: The Theory and Practice of a New World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.  
 
Cohen, Joshua, 2008. Rethinking Human Rights, Democracy, and Sovereignty in the 
Age of Globalization. Political Theory, 36 (4), pp.578-606.  
 
Connolly, William E., 1991. Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political 
Paradox. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Connolly, William E., 2005. Pluralism. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
Oliver Costilla, Lucio Fernando, Barragán Alvarez, Lilia and Carlos Pérez, 2000. The 
Reconstitution of Power and Democracy in the Age of Capital Globalisation, Latin 
American Perspectives 27 (1), pp. 82-104. 
 
Day, Richard, 2005. Gramsci is dead: anarchist currents in the newest social 
movements. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 28 
Douzinas, Costas, 2006. Postmodern Just Wars and the New World Order. Journal of 
Human Rights, 5 (3), 355-375. 
 
Dunne, Tim & Wheeler, Nicholas J., 1999. Introduction: human rights and the fifty 
years’ crisis. In Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, eds. Human Rights in Global 
Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, pp.1-28. 
 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), 1993. Declaración Selva 
Lacandona (First Declaration). [Online] Available at: http://palabra.ezln.org.mx/ 
[Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), 1994a. II Declaración Selva 
Lacandona, June 10 (Second Declaration). [Online] Available at: 
http://palabra.ezln.org.mx/ [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN), 1994b. A Storm and a Prophecy, 
Chiapas: The Southeast in two Winds, January 27, 1994, In Juana Ponce de León, ed. 
Our Word is Our Weapon: Selected writings by Subcomandante Marcos. London: 
Serpent’s Tail, 2001, 22 - 37. 
 
Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) - Subcomandante Marcos, 9 
January 2003. A la organización político-militar vasca Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). 
[Online] Available at: http://palabra.ezln.org.mx/comunicados/2003.htm [Accessed 
08 February 2010].  
 
Evans, Tony, 1998. Introduction: power, hegemony and the universalization of human 
rights. In Tony Evans, ed. Human Rights Fifty Years On. Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1998, pp.2-23. 
 
Evans, Tony, 2005. International Human Rights Law as Power/Knowledge. Human 
Rights Quarterly, 27 (3), pp.1046-1068. 
 
Falk, Richard, 2000. Human Rights Horizons: The Pursuit of Justice in a Globalizing 
World. London: Routledge. 
 
Falk, Richard, 2007. What Comes After Westphalia: The Democratic Challenge. 
Widener Law Review, 13 (2), pp.243-254. 
 
Gearty, Conor, 2005. ‘Can Human Rights Survive? Lecture One: The Crisis of 
Authority’. [Lecture] London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 
Thursday 10 November 2005. Available at: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/humanRights/events/Hamlyn_crisis_of_authority.ht
m [Accessed 23 January 2010] 
 
Gearty, Conor, 2006. Can Human Rights Survive? Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Gilroy, Paul, 1993. The black Atlantic: modernity and double consciousness. London: 
Verso. 
 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 29 
Goodale, Mark, 2006. Toward a Critical Anthropology of Human Rights. Current 
Anthropology, 47 (3), pp.485-511.  
 
Goodale, Mark, 2007. Locating Rights, Envisioning Law Between the Global and the 
Local. In Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry, eds. The Practice of Human Rights. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.1-38. 
 
Graeber, David, 2009. Direct Action: An Etnography. Oakland, CA: AK Press. 
 
Griffin, James, 2008. On Human Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Grovogui, Siba N., 2009. No More, No Less: What Slaves Thought about their 
Humanity. In Gurminder K. Bhamba and Robbie Shilliam, eds. Silencing Human 
Rights: Critical Engagements with a Contested Project. Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009, 
pp. 43-60. 
 
Gutiérrez, Gustavo, 1974. A theology of liberation: history, politics and salvation. 
Translated [from the Spanish] and edited by Sister Caridad Inda & John Eagleson. 
London: S.C.M. Press. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1992. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. 
Cambridge: Polity. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1994. Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty: The Liberal and 
Republican Versions. Ratio Juris, 7 (1), pp.1-13. 
 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1998. Remarks on legitimation through human rights. Philosophy 
& Social Criticism, 24 (2/3), pp.151-171. 
 
Harvey, David, 2005. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Harvey, Neil, 2005. Zapatismo y sustentabilidad. La Jornada, August 14. 
http://www.jornada.unam.mx/2005/08/14/006a1pol.php [Accessed 14 April 2010]  
 
Holloway, John, 2005. Changing the world without changing the power. London: 
Pluto Press. 
 
Hopgood, Stephen, 2006. Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty 
International. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Hopgood, Stephen, 2009. Moral Authority, Modernity and the Politics of the Sacred. 
European Journal of International Relations, 15 (2), pp.229-255. 
 
Honig, Bonnie, 1993. Political Theory and the Displacement of Politics. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Honig, Bonnie, 2008. The Time of Rights: Emergent Thought in an Emergency 
Setting. In David Campbell & Morton Schoolman, eds. The New Pluralism: William 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 30 
Connolly and the contemporary global condition. Durham, NC: Duke University 
Press, 2008, pp.85-120. 
 
Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E., 2005. The Second Great Transformation: Human 
Rights Leapfrogging in the Era of Globalization. Human Rights Quarterly, 27 (1), 
pp.1-40. 
 
Howard-Hassmann, Rhoda E., 2009. Reply to Paul O’Connell’s Article on Neo-
liberal Globalisation and Human Rights. Human Rights Law Review, 9 (1), pp.127-
133. 
 
Hunt, Lynn, 2007. Inventing Human Rights: A History. London: W. W. Norton & 
Company. 
 
Hutchings, Kimberly, 1999. International Political Theory: Rethinking ethics in a 
global era. London: SAGE. 
 
Hutchings, Kimberly, 2005. Speaking and hearing: Habermasian discourse ethics, 
feminism and IR. Review of International Studies, 31 (1), 155-165. 
 
Ignatieff, Michael, 2003. Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press. 
 
Ishay, Micheline R., 2004. The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the 
Globalization Era. London: University of California Press.  
 
Jackson, Jean E., 2007. Rights to indigenous culture in Colombia. In Mark Goodale & 
Sally Merry Engle, eds. The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the 
Global and the Local. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.204-241. 
 
Junta de Buen Gobierno, 26 November 2009. “El Camino del Futuro”, Caracol III, La 
Garrucha, desmiente las mentiras publicadas. [Online] Available at: 
http://enlacezapatista.ezln.org.mx/jbg/2688 [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Keck, Margaret E. & Sikkink, Kathryn, eds.,1998. Activist Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
 
Kohen, Ari, 2006. The Problem of Secular Sacredness: Ronald Dworkin, Michael 
Perry, and Human Rights Foundationalism. Journal of Human Rights, 5 (2), pp.235-
256. 
 
Lacan, Jacques, 1998. The seminar of Jacques Lacan. edited by Jacques-Alain Miller; 
translated with notes by Bruce Fink. New York: W.W. Norton. 1st American ed. 
 
Langlois, Anthony J., 2002. Human rights: the globalization and fragmentation of 
moral discourse. Review of International Studies, 28 (3), pp.479-496. 
 
Lauren, Paul Gordon, 2003. The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions 
Seen. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press. 
 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 31 
Leve, Lauren, 2007. “Secularism is a human right!”: double-binds of Buddhism, 
democracy, and identity in Nepal. In Mark Goodale & Sally Merry Engle, eds. The 
Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the Global and the Local. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.78-114. 
 
MacIntyre, Alasdair, 2007. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. 3rd ed. London: 
Duckworth. 
 
Magubane, Zine, 2005. Overlapping Territories and Intertwined Histories: Historical 
Sociology’s Global Imagination. In Julia Adams, Elisabeth Stephanie Clemens, & 
Ann Shola Orloff, eds. Remaking modernity: politics, history, and sociology. Durham 
and London: Duke University Press, 2005, pp.92-108. 
 
Dias Martins, Mônica, 2006. ‘Learning to Participate: The MST Experience in Brazil’ 
in Rosset, Peter, Patel, Raj and Michael Courville, Land Research Action Network 
Promised land:competing visions of agrarian reform. Oakland: Food First Books, pp. 
265 – 276. 
 
Merry, Sally Engle, 2006b. Transnational Human Rights and Local Activism: 
Mapping the Middle. American Anthropologist, 108 (1), pp.38-51.  
 
Merry, Sally Engle, 2006b. Human Rights and Gender Violence: Translating 
International Law into Local Justice. London: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Merry, Sally Engle, 2007. Introduction: Conditions of Vulnerability. In Mark Goodale 
& Sally Merry Engle, eds. The Practice of Human Rights: Tracking Law Between the 
Global and the Local. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, pp.195-203. 
 
Monsanto, 7 November 2009. Fiscal Fourth-Quarter and Full-Year Financial 
Summary. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.monsanto.com/investors/presentations.asp#2009 [Accessed 07 February 
2010]. 
 
Morton, Adam D., 2002. ‘‘La Resurrección del Maíz’: Globalisation, Resistance and 
the Zapatistas’. Millennium: Journal of International Studies. 31 (1). Pp. 27 – 54. 
 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), 2001. Dear Friends [letter in 
regard to the assassination of a MST militants] 23 July 2001. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.mstbrazil.org/alert091300.html [Accessed 07 February 2010].  
 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), 2009a. Entenda como 
estamos organizados, 10 July 2009. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.mst.org.br/taxonomy/term/330 [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), 2009b. Desrespeito aos 
direitos humanos em Alagoas, 25 November 2009. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.mst.org.br/node/8667 [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), 2010a. About. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.mstbrazil.org/?q=about [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 32 
 
Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra (MST), 2010b. Human Rights 
Sector. [Online] Available at: http://www.mstbrazil.org/humanRights.html [Accessed 
07 February 2010]. 
 
Mutua, Makau, 2002. Human Rights: A Political and Cultural Critique. Philadelphia, 
PA: University of Philadelphia Press. 
 
O’Connell, Paul, 2007. On Reconciling Irreconcilables: Neo-liberal Globalisation and 
Human Rights. Human Rights Law Review, 7 (3), pp.458-509.  
 
O’Connell, Paul, 2009. Not Seeing the Forest for the Trees: A Reply to Rhoda 
Howard-Hassmann. Human Rights Law Review, 9 (1), pp.135-141. 
 
Oxfam International, 1996. Mission statement. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/what/mission [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Oxfam International, 2008. Aid is not enough to address food price crisis. Press 
Release, April 29. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/news/2008/pr080428_aid_is_not_enough_to_address_food_
price_crisis [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Oxfam International, 2010. Why we do it. [Online] Available at: 
http://www.oxfam.org/en/about/why [Accessed 07 February 2010]. 
 
Oxfam UK, 2006. Oxfam's work in Mexico in depth, February 2006. [Online] 
Available at: http://www.oxfam.org.uk/resources/countries/mexico.html [Accessed 07 
February 2010]. 
 
Pagden, Anthony, 2003. Human Rights, Natural Rights, and Europe’s Imperial 
Legacy. Political Theory, 31 (2), pp.171-199.  
 
Rana, Rajat, 2007. Symphony of Decolonisation: Third World and Human Rights 
Discourse. The International Journal of Human Rights, 11 (4), pp.367-379. 
 
Rawls, John, 2001. The Law of Peoples. London: Harvard University Press. 
 
Raz, Joseph, 2007. Human Rights Without Foundations. Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 14/2007. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=999874. 
 
Reinbold, Jenna, 2011. ‘Political Myth and the Sacred Center of Human Rights: The 
Universal Declaration and the Narrative of ‘Inherent Human Dignity’’ in Human 
Rights Review (COPY EDITOR PLEASE ENTER CITATION TO THIS 
VOLUME). 
 
Reilly, Niamh, 2007. Cosmopolitan Feminism and Human Rights. Hypatia, 22 (4), 
pp.180-198. 
 
Draft Do Note Cite Without Permission 
 33 
Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), 2005. Breve Historia del PRI.  [Online] 
Available at: http://www.pri.org.mx/priistastrabajando/pri/historia/Default.aspx 
[Accessed 14 April 2010] 
 
Risse, Thomas, Ropp, Stephen C., & Sikkink, Kathryn, eds., 1999. Power of Human 
Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Risse, Thomas and Ropp, Stephen C., 1999. International human rights norms and 
domestic change: conclusions, in Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp and Kathryn 
Sikkink, Power of Human Rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 
pp.234-278. 
 
Robinson, Fiona, 1998. The limits of a rights-based approach to international ethics. 
In Tony Evans, ed. Human Rights Fifty Years On: A reappraisal. Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1998, pp.58-76. 
 
Robinson, Fiona, 2003. Human rights and the global politics of resistance: feminist 
perspective. Review of International Studies, 29 (1), pp.161-180. 
 
Rocker, Rudolf, 1938. Anarcho-syndicalism. London : Secker & Warburg, 1938. 
 
Stahler-Sholk, Richard, 2005. Time of the Snails: Autonomy and Resistance in 
Chiapas. NACLA Report on the Americas, 38 (5), [Online] Available at: 
https://nacla.org/node/4185 [Accessed 14 April 2010] 
 
Stammers, Neil, 1999. Social Movement and the Social Construction of Human 
Rights. Human Rights Quarterly, 21 (4), pp.980-1008.  
 
Stammers, Neil, 2009. Human Rights and Social Movements. London: Pluto Press. 
 
Tasioulas, John, 2002. Human Rights, Universality and the Values of Personhood: 
Retracing Griffin’s Steps. European Journal of Philosophy, 10 (1), pp.79-100. 
 
Van Den Hemel, Ernst, 2008. Included But Not Belonging: Badiou and Rancière on 
Human Rights. Krisis: Journal for Contemporary Philosophy, Issue 3, pp.16-30. 
 
Toledo, Victor, 1999. El otro zapatismo: luchas indígenas de inspiración ecológica en 
México, Ecología Política, 18, pp. 11-22. 
 
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy, 1987. The rise (and sometimes fall) of guerrilla 
governments in Latin America. Sociological Forum (Historical Archive), 2 (3), pp. 
473-499. 
 
Williams, Bernard, 2005.  In the Beginning was the Deed: Realism and Moralism in 
Political Argument. Edited by Geoffrey Hawthorn.  Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press. 
 
Wright, Angus L. and Wendy Wolford, 2003. To Inherit the Earth: The Landless 
Movement and he Struggle for a New Brazil. Oakland: Food First Books. 
